This paper studies the role of credit-supply factors in business cycle fluctuations. To this end, an imperfectly competitive banking sector is introduced into a DSGE model with financial frictions. Banks issue collateralized loans to both households and firms, obtain funding via deposits and accumulate capital out of retained earnings. Margins charged on loans depend on bank capital-to-assets ratio and on the degree of interest rate stickiness. Bank balance-sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and the cost of loans. The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques using data for the euro area. The analysis delivers the following results. First, the existence of a banking sector partially attenuates the effects of demand shocks, while it helps propagating supply shocks. Second, shocks originating in the banking sector explain the largest fraction of the fall of output in 2008 in the euro area, while macroeconomic shocks played a limited role. Third, an unexpected destruction of bank capital has a substantial impact on the real economy and particularly on investment.
Introduction
This paper seeks to understand the role of financial frictions and banking intermediation in shaping business-cycle dynamics. To this end, we formulate and estimate a dynamic general equilibrium model incorporating a banking sector that enjoys some degree of market power (on both sides of the balance sheet) and that accumulates bank capital subject to a capital adequacy requirement. We use our model to investigate, first, how the transmission mechanisms of monetary and technology impulses are modified by the introduction of banking and, second, how shocks that originate in credit markets are transmitted to the real economy. Moreover, we estimate the contribution of shocks originating within the banking sector to the slowdown in euro area economic activity during 2008.
Our main motivation comes from the recent financial crisis. Policy-makers have traditionally highlighted the importance of financial factors in shaping the business cycle: the possible interactions between credit markets and the real economy are a customary part of the overall assessment on the policy stance. Since the onset of the financial turmoil in August 2007, the potential strength of these interlinkages has become particularly evident. Banks came under the spotlight, as losses from subprime credit exposure and from significant write-offs on asset-backed securities raised concerns that a wave of widespread credit restrictions might have triggered a severe economic downturn.
Despite this relevance for policy-making, most quantitative macromodels employed in academia and policy institutions until recently contained only a very primitive treatment of the interaction between financial and credit markets, on the one hand, and the rest of the economy, on the other. Seminal contributions from Bernanke et al. (1999) and Iacoviello (2005) have started to fill this gap by introducing credit and collateral requirements in quantitative general equilibrium models. As in these models credit transactions take place only through the market, more recent models have begun to study the role of financial intermediaries (Christiano et al., 2008; Goodfriend and McCallum, 2007) . Most of these models, however, emphasize the demand side of credit. The credit spread that arises in equilibrium (called the external finance premium) is a function of the riskiness of the entrepreneurs' investment projects and/or their net wealth. Banks, operating under perfect competition, simply accommodate the changing conditions from the demand side.
We instead believe that conditions from the supply side of credit markets -as the degree of competition prevailing in the banking sector, the rate-setting strategies or banks' financial soundness -are at least as important to shape business cycle dynamics, especially in the euro area where banks are the primary source of funds for households and firms. 1 This relation is evident by looking at the responses of the banks surveyed in the euro area quarterly Bank Lending Survey. In Figure 1 , separately for entrepreneurs' and 1 In 2008, bank deposits in the euro area accounted for around 95% of household short-term financial assets, while bank loans equaled around 90% of total household liabilities; similarly for firms, in 2008 bank lending accounted for almost 90% of corporate financial debt (i.e. loans plus debt securities) (ECB, 2009a) .
households' loans, we report two charts showing the behavior of the synthetic indexes of loan supply restriction (i.e. the net percentage of responding banks indicating a tightening in lending standards in any given quarter), of lending margins (as reported by the responding banks) and of the impact of competitive pressure and costs related to banks' capital position on lending standards (again, as reported by banks). These figures document how supply factors like these related to the degree of competition among banks or to the costs of banking capital positions strongly comove, over different periods, with rates and conditions for access to credit. Our model is designed to capture supply side aspects of this kind. Starting from a standard model, featuring credit frictions and borrowing constraints as in Iacoviello (2005) and a set of real and nominal frictions as in Christiano et al. (2005) or Smets and Wouters (2003) , we add a stylized banking sector characterized by three distinctive features. First, our banks set different rates for households and firms and, in doing so, they enjoy some degree of market power. The recognition that a degree of monopolistic power exists in both the loan and the deposit markets generates in the model markups (and a markdown) with respect to the policy rate, that adjust along the cycle. Since the seminal contributions of Monti (1972) and Klein (1971) the microliterature on banking has recognized the importance of studying models of monopolistic competition in the banking sector. Theoretical justifications range from asymmetric information to longterm customer relationships or the presence of switching costs and other nominal frictions. In this paper, we do not try to investigate the source of the market power we attribute to banks. Instead, we calibrate the rate elasticities of loan and deposit demands in the model to reproduce the degree of market power empirically observed in the euro area.
Second, our monopolistic banks face costs of adjusting their retail rates, and the passthrough of changing financing conditions is incomplete on impact. This is an important ingredient if the model has to capture the different speeds at which the variety of banks rates react to changing conditions in money markets. The empirical evidence in favor of a partial and heterogenous adjustment of bank rates is overwhelming (e.g., for the euro area, de Bondt, 2005 and Kok Sørensen and Werner, 2006).
Third, banks accumulate capital (out of retained earnings), as they try to keep their capital-to-assets ratio as close as possible to an (exogenously given) target level. This target level might derive from mandatory capital requirements for banking activity (like those explicitly set forth in the Basel Accords) or, in a deeper structural model, might be the equilibrium outcome from optimally balancing the higher costs of internal sources of funding and the benefits of having more "skin in the game" to mitigate typical agency problems in credit markets. Through this leverage ratio and the bank balance sheet identity, bank capital influences both the amounts issued and the rate setting of loans and deposits. This introduces important feedbacks between the real and the financial sides of the economy. On the one hand, we can model some shocks that originate in credit markets as "financial" shocks; on the other hand, macro shocks are amplified and/or propagated to a different extent depending on the "soundness" of the financial sector, i.e. depending on whether or not the banking sector is at the optimal leverage ratio when the macro shock hits.
Other authors have studied dynamic general equilibrium models with a banking sector or economies where several financial instruments co-exist. In independent works, Cúrdia and Woodford (2008), Andrés and Arce (2008) , Benes and Lees (2007) , Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2007) and Aslam and Santoro (2008) have developed models with financial intermediaries and a time-varying spread between deposits and lending rates. Markovic (2006) , de Walque et al. (2008) , van der Heuvel (2008) and Meh and Moran (2008) have instead studied the role of equity and bank capital for the transmission of macroeconomic shocks. None of them includes either (heterogeneous) rate stickiness, or the kind of capital requirements that we consider. Therefore our model combines the main insights from these strands of literature and adds to them. Moreover, by taking the model to the data we provide a careful quantitative evaluation of our model results.
In fact, we estimate the model with Bayesian techniques and data for the euro area over the period 1998:1-2009:1 and use the estimated model to analyze two sets of issues.
First, we want to understand how financial intermediation modifies the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and technology shocks. Our model features an intermediation spread due to the interest-rate setting behavior of banks. Movements in this spread alter the pass-through of changes in the policy rate to bank rates, which are the relevant rates for consumption and investment decisions. This mechanism modifies the effectiveness of the transmission channels that are usually at work in standard models with endogenous borrowing constraints and no active financial intermediation (see Sec. 5). In particular, credit market power and the ensuing markup between lending rates and the policy rate amplify changes in the policy rate for borrowers (i.e. impatient households and entrepreneurs), while the markdown between the policy and the deposit rate implies an attenuating effect for lenders (i.e. patient agents). Sticky interest rates, instead, unambiguously induce an attenuation effect (with respect to a flexible-rate setup), as banks translate changes in the policy rate to borrowing and lending rates only partially. Finally, the impact of bank capital depends on the correlation between bank leverage (i.e. the inverse of the capital-to-assets ratio) and the policy rate: if bank leverage increases when policy is tightened, then the transmission of shocks to the real economy is amplified; on the contrary, a fall in leverage during periods of policy tightening smooths fluctuations in the real economy. Given these facts, the overall impact of financial intermediation on the transmission mechanism depends on the relative importance and the mutual interactions of the heterogenous effects to the various agents. As regards monetary policy, overall we find that the attenuating effect of banking prevails, muting the response of both consumption and investment and mainly reflecting the presence of sticky bank rates. Also after a technology shock financial intermediation induces some attenuation on output, mainly due to the impact of monopolistic power on consumption; in this case, however, bank-ing also enhances the endogenous propagation mechanism of the model, inducing higher persistence in the response of real variables.
Secondly, we analyze how financial shocks are transmitted to the real economy and how they contribute to business cycle fluctuations. In the model, we assume that bank rate margins, as well as credit supply, are subject to exogenous innovations. Thus, the model is a well-suited environment to study how those shocks affect households' and entrepreneurs' consumption and investment decisions. To this end, we perform two exercises. In the first one, we use the model to quantify (ex-post) the contribution of shocks originating in the banking sector to the slowdown experienced in the euro area in 2008. The results suggest that almost all the contraction of real GDP was due to factors that either pushed up the cost of credit or reduced the amount of credit available to the private sector. In the second exercise, we simulate a "credit crunch" scenario, instrumented through an exogenous and persistent destruction of bank capital. Banks' need to handle the capital loss, by re-balancing assets and liabilities and minimizing costs from deviation from a target leverage ratio, triggers an increase in lending margins and a contraction in credit volumes. Ensuing negative effects on real activity are substantial: the restriction on credit severely affects firms' investment, while aggregate consumption is also hit despite a temporary improvement in labor income, generating a considerable fall in aggregate demand and output.
Our model admittedly leaves out some elements of the current financial crisis (e.g., the increase in risk in financial markets and the freezing up of money markets). However, we think that our analysis constitutes an important step in the direction of quantifying the effects of credit sector shocks on the business cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some arguments and empirical evidence justifying our key modeling choices. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 presents the results of the estimation of the model. Section 5 studies the dynamic properties of the model focusing on monetary policy and technology shocks. Section 6 quantifies the role of shocks originating in the banking sector in the recent downturn of economic activity in the euro area and studies the effects of a fall in bank capital on the economy. Section 7 offers some concluding remarks.
Market power and sluggish rates in the banking sector
In this section we discuss the key assumptions that we make about the banking sector, namely the presence of monopolistic power in the deposit and loan markets, as well as the stickiness of bank rates with respect to movements in the corresponding market rates, reviewing both theoretical and empirical arguments in their support. As regards monopolistic competition, there seems to be an undisputed consensus in the microeconomic theory of financial intermediation about the existence of market power in banking.
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One often cited reason is the presence of switching costs, for both customers and lenders, generating a "lock-in" effect that gives banks market power. The banking industry is typically characterized by long-term relationships between banks and borrowers, as a result of asymmetric information problems which induce banks to devote resources to monitor their customers.
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Given such market structure, switching banks is typically costly for customers: changing financier entails the loss of the capitalized value of an established relationship and the associated cost of signalling creditworthiness to the new lender (or of having the value of collateral re-assessed). Similarly, potential competitors wishing to attract customers from incumbent banks face the additional cost of screening the new customers. Switching costs might also arise due to the presence of pure "menu costs", like technical fees charged to close or to setup a bank account, or fees incurred to apply for a loan or to renegotiate the terms of an outstanding debt.
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Another well-cited source of bank rents is market structure. The traditional SCP (structure-conduct-performance) approach typically links market concentration (as measured by the Herfindal-Hirschman Index or by the n-bank concentration rate) to market power and interest-rate setting behavior (Berger et al., 2004) . Other studies highlight the importance of market contestability and regulatory restrictions as a source of market power (Demirguc- Levine, 2003) . Whatever the source, market power in loan and deposit markets allows banks to set interest rates at a spread with respect to relevant market rates, i.e. a markup in the case of loans and a markdown for deposits.
On the empirical side, several studies have confirmed the presence of market power in the banking sector and studied its determinants over the business cycle. Berger et al. (2004) and Degryse and Ongena (2008) provide extensive surveys of the empirical literature on this topic and, overall, conclude that the degree of competition -measured via different indicators -indeed influences interest rate spreads and bank profitability. Among the papers cited therein, Mandelman (2006) , using data for 124 countries for the years 1990-2000, documents how cyclical fluctuations in bank markups are related to changes in the concentration and competitive pressure within the sector. Claessens Diamond (1984) for some early seminal contributions, and Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990) for later models. 4 Von Thadden (2004) discusses switching costs due to information asymmetries between lenders. See Miles (2004) for a detailed description of debt renegotiation costs for the UK or Kim et al. (2003) for an estimate of the importance of switching costs in banking.
5 The H-statistic is an extensively used empirical measure of industry market power, allowing to discriminate among monopoly (H ≤ 0), monopolistic competition (0 < H < 1) and perfect competition (H = 1). In banking, it can be computed as the sum of the elasticities of interest revenues with respect to factor input prices.
of the area (Germany, France and Italy) operate under monopolistic competition, with the degree of market power being higher for small banks in all three countries in their sample, perhaps as they cater more to local markets.
In our model, the measure of banks' market power is the (steady-state) interest rate elasticities of deposit and loan demands: the lower the elasticities (in absolute value), the higher the monopoly power. These elasticities equal 1,5 for the deposit rate and around -3,0 for both loan rates.
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These numbers are pretty much in line with estimates from empirical studies.
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For example, Dick (2002) estimates an interest-rate demand elasticity for deposits at US commercial banks over the period 1993-1999 of between 5.8 and 1.5; Neven and Röller (1999), using data for 7 European countries for the period 1981-1989, find a demand elasticity for loans equal to -8.7 and -6.8, respectively, for mortgages and corporate loans. Other possible indicators of market power are (steady-state) spreads between the loan and the policy rate and between the policy rate and the deposit rate, which equal 1.7 and 1.2 percent (annual rates) in the model, and the loan-deposit rate margin (i.e. the sum of the two spreads, equal 2.9). Similar numbers are found in empirical studies for European countries. For example, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) The second "unconventional" assumption we make regarding the banking sector is that bank interest rates are "sticky", i.e. they react slowly to changes in the corresponding market rates (or in the policy rate). Both theoretical reasons and empirical findings strongly support this assumption. From a theoretical point of view, for example, a bank could find it optimal to adjust rates only infrequently if customers' demand is inelastic in the short run due to switching costs (Calem et al., 2006) or if there are fixed ("menu") costs of adjusting rates (Berger and Hannan, 1991) . Moreover, the importance of preserving customer relationships could induce banks to smooth rates over the business cycle, in order to shield borrowers from market rate fluctuations; such "implicit interest rate insurance" gives banks the possibility to enjoy higher profits by charging higher interest rates during 6 As explained in Sec. 4, demand elasticities pin down the (steady-state) spreads between the loans and the policy rate and between the latter and the deposit rate. Thus, we calibrate elasticities so as to replicate the empirical margins observed between those rates in the euro area over our sample period. 7 Our calibration is actually likely to overstate the effect of market power as we disregard liquidity and/or risk premia that might be embedded in retail bank rates. This implies that we regard our calibrated elasticities as lower bounds when we compare them to estimates from the literature. 8 In order to obtain a quantification of the degree of market power that we assume in the model and to assess how reasonable such assumption is, we calculated the H-statistic implied by the estimated version of our model, simulating 10,000 observations for the loan interest revenues and for the loan input prices. We obtain a value of 0.54, which is very similar to the standard findings in the empirical literature (see Claessens and Laeven, 2004, or Bikker and Haaf, 2002 ).
periods of low market interest rates (Berger and Udell, 1992) . From an empirical point of view, beside the bankers' practice to index bank rates to past values of some corresponding market rate -which can in principle generate sluggishness by itself -the amount of empirical evidence in favor of bank rate stickiness is overwhelming. Just to mention some recent analyses for the euro area, Kok Sørensen and Werner (2006), comparing interest rate pass-through across euro area countries for various loan and deposit instruments, find that, even in the country with the highest speed of adjustment, only 23% of the disequilibrium is adjusted after one period. In a related paper, Gropp et al. (2007) report that deposit rates adjust more slowly than lending rates and that, in general, the speed of adjustment is influenced by the degree of competition, both from other banks and from financial markets. De Bondt (2005) reports euro area evidence of limited impact and first-year pass-through both from official rates to market rates and from market rates to bank rates. 9 Nakajima and Teranishi (2009) estimate loan rate curves using a structural model which is similar to ours, in that it features monopolistic competition in the banking sector with Calvo-adjustment of loan rates. Their results confirm that loan rates adjust slowly to changes in the policy rate in euro area countries for all loan maturities in their sample.
In our model, in order to introduce sticky rates we assume that banks face quadratic adjustment costsà la Rotemberg whenever they change the level of retail rates. We are aware that such an assumption is somewhat ad hoc and it leaves the issue of the microfoundation of stickiness basically unresolved. However, there is no difference with the standard assumption of costly-price adjustment in goods markets, which is crucial in New Keynesian DSGE models. Assuming these adjustment costs is just a modeling short-cut to capture a stylized fact in a tractable way. In addition, we do not impose a sticky rate adjustment a priori, but the parameters pinning down the degree of stickiness (κ bE , κ bH and κ d , respectively for household and entrepreneur loans and for deposits) are estimated based on euro area data (see Sec. 4 and App. B). This procedure leaves us confident with the assumption of Rotemberg pricing, as it is useful to reconcile model dynamics with observed data. And data tell us that rates are indeed sticky: our estimates imply a short-run pass-through of policy rates to bank interest rates in the range of the estimates obtained by ECB (2009b).
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The estimated stickiness is "genuine" in the sense that it does not reflect compositional issues or the choice of a particular type of bank rates for the estimation. The data employed refer to new-business coverage, i.e. they are average rates on newly issued loans in a given quarter, both for deposits and for loans. These rates do not embed sluggishness just by construction, as would have been the case if we had used rates on outstanding loans that are heavily influenced by rates set in the past. In this sense it seems that the rate stickiness we found in the data mostly reflects banks' optimizing behavior.
The model economy
The economy is populated by two types of households and by entrepreneurs. Households consume, work and accumulate housing (in fixed supply), while entrepreneurs produce an homogenous intermediate good using capital bought from capital-good producers and labor supplied by households. The three types of agents differ in their degree of impatience, i.e. in the discount factor they apply to the stream of future utility.
Two types of one-period financial instruments, supplied by banks, are available to agents: saving assets (deposits) and loans. When taking on a bank loan, agents face a borrowing constraint, tied to the value of tomorrow collateral holdings: households can borrow against their stock of housing, while entrepreneurs' borrowing capacity is tied to the value of their physical capital. The heterogeneity in agents' discount factors determines positive financial flows in equilibrium: patient households purchase a positive amount of deposits and do not borrow, while impatients households and entrepreneurs borrow a positive amount of loans. The banking sector operates in a regime of monopolistic competition: banks set interest rates on deposits and on loans so to maximize profits. The amount of loans issued by each intermediary can be financed through the amount of deposits that they rise and through bank capital (accumulated out of reinvested profits).
On the production side, workers supply their differentiated labor services through unions which set wages to maximize members' utility subject to adjustment costs. In addition to entrepreneurs producing the intermediate good, there are two additional producing sectors: a monopolistically competitive retail sector and a capital good producing sector. Retailers buy the intermediate goods from entrepreneurs in a competitive market, differentiate and price them subject to nominal rigidities. Capital good producers are used as a modeling device to derive a market price for capital, which determines the value of entrepreneurs' available collateral, against which banks grant loans.
In the following sections we describe in detail the banking setup and the households and entrepreneurs problems. The rest of the model is laid down in Appendix A.
Households and entrepreneurs
There exist two groups of households, patients (P ) and impatients (I), and entrepreneurs (E). Each of these groups has unit mass. The only difference between household types is that patients' discount factor (β P ) is higher than impatients' (β I , equal to entrepreneurs' β E ). This difference in discount factors makes savers the agents of the former group, and borrowers the others.
Patient households
The representative patient household maximizes the expected utility
1 + φ which depends on current individual (and lagged aggregate) consumption c P t , housing services h P t and hours worked l P t . There are external and group-specific habits in consumption; premultiplication by one minus the habit coefficient a P mutes their impact on the steady state marginal utility of consumption. Preferences are subject to two disturbances: one affecting consumption (ε z t ) and one housing demand (ε h t ).
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Household choices have to match the following budget constraint (in real terms, with multiplier λ P t ):
The flow of expenses includes current consumption, accumulation of housing services (with real price q h t ) and deposits to be made this period d t . Resources are composed of wage earnings w P t l P t (where w P t is the real wage rate for the labor input of each patient household), gross interest income on last period deposits (1 + r
is the gross inflation) and a number of lump-sum transfers t P t , which include a labor union membership net fee and dividends from firms and banks (of which patient households are the only owners).
Impatient households
The representative impatient household maximizes the expected utility 
With the exception of a white noise for monetary policy, we assume that any generic shock ε t in the model follows a stochastic AR(1) process of the type
where ρ ε is the autoregressive coefficient,ε is the steady-state value and η In addition, households face a borrowing constraint: the expected value of their collateralizable housing stock at period t must be high enough to guarantee lenders of debt repayment. The constraint is
where m I t is the (stochastic) loan-to-value ratio (LTV) for mortgages. From a microeconomic point of view, (1-m I t ) can be interpreted as the proportional cost of collateral repossession for banks given default. At a macro-level, the value of m I t determines the amount of credit that banks make available to households, for a given (discounted) value of their housing stock. We assume variations of the LTV ratios to depend on macroeconomic conditions rather than on individual bank choices: they are therefore modeled as an exogenous stochastic process, whose innovations will allow us to study the effects oft , the degree of capacity utilization u t and the desired amount of labor input l E t . His decisions are subject to the budget constraint
where δ is depreciation, q k t is the price of one unit of physical capital in terms of consumption, ψ(u t )k E t−1 is the real cost of setting a level u t of utilization rate, P W t /P t = 1/x t is the relative competitive price of the wholesale good produced by each entrepreneur according to the technology y
with a E t being a stochastic process for total factor productivity. Aggregate labor l E t combines inputs from patient and impatient households according to l
. Symmetrically with respect to households, we assume that the amount of resources that banks are willing to lend to entrepreneurs is constrained by the value of their collateral, which is given by their holdings of physical capital. This assumption differs from Iacoviello (2005) , where also entrepreneurs borrow against housing (commercial real estate), but it seems a more realistic modeling choice, as overall balance-sheet conditions give the soundness and creditworthiness of a firm. The borrowing constraint is thus
where m E t is the stochastic entrepreneurs' LTV ratio. Our assumption on discount factors is such that, absent uncertainty, the borrowing constraints of both impatients and entrepreneurs are binding in a neighborhood of the steady state. As in Iacoviello (2005), we assume that the size of the shocks in the model is "small enough" so to remain in such a neighborhood, and we can thus solve our model imposing that the borrowing constraints always bind.
Loans and deposits demand
To model market power in the banking industry, we assume a Dixit-Stiglitz framework for the credit market.
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In particular, we assume that units of deposits and of loan contracts bought by households and entrepreneurs are a composite CES basket of slightly differentiated products -each supplied by a branch of a bank j-with elasticities of substitution equal to ε and ε bE t , respectively. We assume that these elasticities of substitution among contracts offered by different banks are stochastic. This choice arises from our interest in studying how exogenous shocks hitting the banking sector transmit to the real economy. ε bH t and ε bE t (ε d t ) affect the value of the markups (markdowns) that banks charge when setting interest rates and, thus, the value of the spreads between the policy rate and the retail loan (deposit) rates. Innovations to the loan (deposit) markup (markdown) can thus be interpreted as innovations to bank spreads arising independently of monetary policy and we can take account of their effects on the real economy.
The demands for loans to households b I t (j), loans to entrepreneurs b E t (j) and deposits d t (j) at bank j will depend on overall volumes and on the interest rates charged by bank j relative to the average rates in the economy:
Banks
Banks play a central role in our model since they intermediate all financial transactions between agents in the model. The only saving instrument available to patient households is bank deposits, while the only way to borrow, for impatient households and entrepreneurs, is by applying for a bank loan. One key ingredient in how we model banks is the introduction of monopolistic competition at the banking retail level. Banks enjoy market power in conducting their intermediation activity, which allows them to adjust rates on loans and on deposits in response to shocks or other cyclical conditions in the economy. The imperfect competition setup allows us to study how different degrees of interest rate pass-through affect the transmission of shocks, in particular monetary policy.
Another key feature of our banks is that each has to obey a balance sheet identity
stating that each bank can finance loans B t using either deposits D t or bank equity (also called bank capital in the following) K b t .
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The two sources of finance are perfect substitutes from the point of view of the balance sheet. Banks choice will be pinned down by a further assumption of an (exogenously given) "optimal" capital-to-assets (i.e. leverage) ratio from which it is costly to deviate, which can be thought of as capturing the trade-offs that, in a more structural model, would arise in the decision of how much own resources to hold, or alternatively as a shortcut for studying the implications and costs of regulatory capital requirements. Given this assumption, bank capital will have a key role in determining the conditions of credit supply, both for quantities and for prices. Furthermore, since we assume that bank capital is accumulated out of retained earnings, banks in the model are at the center of a feedback loop between the real and the financial side of the economy. As macroeconomic conditions deteriorate, banks profits and hence capital might be negatively hit; depending on the nature of the shock that hits the economy, banks might respond to the ensuing weakening of their financial position (i.e. increased leverage) by reducing the amount of loans they are willing to extend to the private sector, thus exacerbating the original contraction. The model might thus potentially account for the type of "credit cycle" typically observed in recent recession episodes, with a weakening real economy, a reduction of bank profits, a weakening of banks' capital position and the ensuing credit restriction.
Modeling banks' leverage position and rate-setting activity on loans subject to collateral requirements allows us to introduce a number of shocks that originate from the supply side of credit and thus to study their effects and their propagation to the real economy. In particular we can study the effects of a drastic weakening in the balance sheet position of the banking sector, or the effect of an exogenous rise in loans rates or LTV ratios.
To better highlight the distinctive features of our banking sector and to facilitate exposition, we can think of each bank j (j ∈ [0, 1]) in the model as actually composed of three parts, two "retail" branches and one "wholesale" unit. The two retail branches are responsible for giving out differentiated loans to impatients and to entrepreneurs and for raising differentiated deposits from patient households, respectively. These branches set rates in a monopolistic competitive fashion, subject to adjustment costs. The wholesale unit manages the capital position of the group.
Wholesale branch
Each wholesale branch operates under perfect competition and combines net worth, or bank capital (K b t ), and wholesale deposits (D t ) on the liability side and issues wholesale loans (B t ) on the asset side. We impose a cost on this wholesale activity related to the capital position of the bank. In particular, the bank pays a quadratic cost (parameterized by a coefficient κ Kb and proportional to outstanding bank capital) whenever the capitalto-assets ratio K b t /B t moves away from an "optimal" or target value ν b . This parameter is usually set equal to 0.09 in our numerical experiments, a level consistent with much of the regulatory capital requirements for banks, and which is also meant to strike a balance among the various trade-offs involved when deciding how much own resources a bank should hold.
Bank capital is accumulated each period out of retained earnings according to: The dividend policy is assumed to be exogenously fixed, so that bank capital is not a choice variable for the bank. The problem for the wholesale bank is thus to choose loans and deposits so to maximize the discounted sum of cash flows, subject to a balance sheet constraint:
where R b t -the net wholesale loan rate -and R d t -the net wholesale deposit rate -are taken as given. Using the balance sheet identity (5) twice (at date t and t + 1), the objective function boils down to period profits
The f.o.c.'s deliver a condition linking the spread between wholesale rates on loans and on deposits to the degree of leverage B t /K b t , i.e.:
14 Banks value the future stream of profits using the patient households stochastic discount factor Λ P 0,t since they are owned by patients.
in order to close the model, we assume that banks have access to unlimited finance at the policy rate r t from a lending facility at the central bank: hence, by arbitrage the deposit rate is pinned down in the interbank market and R d t ≡ r t . Therefore, equation (6) becomes a condition linking the rate on wholesale loans prevailing in the interbank market to the official rate, on one hand, and to the leverage of the banking sector on the other:
The above equation highlights the role of capital in determining loan supply conditions. Rewriting it in terms of the spread between wholesale loan and deposit rates yields:
The spread is inversely related to the overall capital-to-assets ratio of banks: in particular, when banks are scarcely capitalized and leverage increases, margins become wider. On the one hand, the higher is leverage, the wider (i.e. more positive) is the spread between the wholesale loan rate and the policy rate, the more a bank wants to lend, increasing profits per unit of capital (or return on equity). On the other hand, with leverage further increasing, the deviation from ν becomes more costly, reducing bank profits. In this case, the f.o.c. commands that the optimal choice for banks is to choose a level of loans (and thus of leverage, given K b t ) such that the marginal cost of reducing the capital-to-assets ratio exactly equals the deposit-loan spread.
Retail banking
Retail banks are monopolistic competitors both on the loans and on the deposits markets.
Loan branch: The retail loan branch of bank j obtains wholesale loans B t (j) from the wholesale unit at rate R b t , differentiates them at no cost and resells them to households and firms applying two distinct markups. In order to introduce stickiness and to study the implication of an imperfect bank pass-through, we assume that each retail bank faces quadratic adjustment costs for changing the rates it charges on loans; these costs are parameterized by κ bE and κ bH and are proportional to aggregate returns on loans. Retail loan bank j solves max {r By solving the equation forward, one could see that loan rates are set by banks based on current and expected future values of the wholesale bank rate, which is the relevant marginal cost for this type of banks and which depends on the policy rate and the capital position of the bank, as highlighted in the previous section. The adjustment to changes in the wholesale rate depends inversely on the intensity of the adjustment costs (as measured by κ bs ) and positively on the degree of competition in the bank loans sector (as measured by the inverse of ε (9) and interest rates on loans are set as a simple markup over the marginal cost. We can also calculate the spread between the loan and the policy rate under flexible rates:
with the last equality obtained by combining (9) with the expression in (7). The spread on retail loans is thus increasing in the policy rate, and is proportional to the wholesale spread S W t , determined by the bank capital position. In addition, the degree of monopolistic competition also plays a role, as an increase in market power (i.e. a reduction in the elasticity of substitution ε bs t ) determines -ceteris paribus -a wider absolute spread. This relation between the elasticity and the loan spread allows us to interpret shocks to ε bs t , which we model as a stochastic process, as exogenous innovations to the bank loan margin.
Deposit branch: Analogously, the retail deposit branch of bank j collects deposits d t (j) from households and then passes the raised funds to the wholesale unit, which remunerates them at rate r t . The problem for the deposit branch is
subject to deposits demand (4) and with D t (j) = d t (j). Quadratic adjustment costs for changing the deposit rate are parameterized by the coefficient κ d and are proportional to aggregate interests paid on deposits. After imposing a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order condition for optimal deposit interest rate setting is
For a simplified case in which ε d is non-stochastic, the linearized version of (11) iŝ
The deposit rate is set by banks taking into account the expected future level of the policy rate. The adjustment to changes in the policy rate depends inversely on how severe are adjustment costs (i.e. on κ d ) and positively on the degree of competition in banks fund raising (as measured by the inverse of ε d ). With fully flexible rates, r d t is determined as a static markdown over the policy rate:
Overall real profits of a bank are the sum of net earnings (intermediation margins minus other costs) from the wholesale unit and the retail branches. After deleting the intra-group transactions, their expression is:
where Adj B t (j) indicates adjustment costs for changing interest rates on loans and deposits.
Estimation

Methodology and data
We linearize the equations describing the model around the steady state. The solution takes the form of a state-space model that is used to compute the likelihood function. We use a Bayesian approach and choose prior distributions for the parameters which are added to the likelihood function; the estimation of the implied posterior distribution of the parameters is done using the Metropolis algorithm (see Wouters, 2007, and Lindé et al., 2007) .
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We use twelve observables: real consumption, real investment, real house prices, real deposits, real loans to households and firms, overnight rate, interest rates on deposits, loans to firms and households, wage inflation and consumer price inflation. 2009:1. We remove the trend from the variables using the HP filter with smoothing parameter set at 1,600 (while all rates are simply demeaned). We also estimated the model with linearly detrended data and obtained very similar results in terms of the posterior distribution of parameters.
We estimate the parameters that affect the dynamics of the model and calibrate those determining the steady state so to obtain reasonable values for key steady-state values and ratios. Table 1 reports the values of the calibrated parameters.
Calibrated parameters and prior distributions
Calibrated parameters We set the patients' discount factor at 0.9943, in order to obtain a steady-state interest rate on deposits slightly above 2 per cent on an annual basis, in line with the average monthly rate on M2 deposits in the euro area over the sample period. As for impatient households' and entrepreneurs' discount factors β I and β E , we set them at 0.975, in the range suggested by Iacoviello (2005) Using our data set, we compute for the euro area an average ratio of long-term loans to the value of shares and other equities for the non financial corporations sector of around 0.41; using short-term instead of long-term loans we obtain a smaller value of around 0.2. Based on this evidence, and given that in estimation we will use rates on loans to firms with original rate fixation above 1 year, we decide to set m E at 0.35. The capital share is set to 0.25 and the depreciation rate to 0.025. In the labor market we assume a markup of 15 per cent and set ε l at 5. In the goods market, a value of 6 for ε y in steady state delivers a markup of 20 percent, a value commonly used in the literature. We specify ψ(u t ) = ξ 1 (u t − 1) + For the banking parameters, no corresponding estimate is exactly available in the literature. Thus, we calibrate them so as to replicate some statistical properties of bank interest rates and spreads. Equation (12) shows that the steady-state spread between the deposit rate and the interbank rate depends only on ε is set at the value (0.1049) that ensures that the ratio of bank capital to total loans is exactly 0.09.
Prior distributions Our priors are listed in Tables 2A and 2B . Overall, they are either consistent with the previous literature or relatively uninformative. For the persistence, we choose a beta-distribution with a prior mean of 0.8 and standard deviation of 0.1. We set the prior mean of the habit parameters in consumption a
at 0.5 (with a standard error of 0.1). For the monetary policy specification, we assume prior means for φ R , φ π and φ y equal, respectively, to 0.75, 2.0 and 0.1. We set the prior mean of the parameters measuring the adjustment costs for prices κ p and wages κ w to 50 with standard deviation of 20. The priors for the indexation parameters ι p and ι w are loosely centered around 0.5, as in Smets and Wouters (2007) . As for the parameters governing interest rates adjustment costs, their prior means are set at values between 3 and 10, chosen so that the coefficients in the loglinearized rate-setting equations imply immediate pass-throughs of the size documented in ECB (2009b); the standard deviations are set at 2.5. The prior on the banking regulatory parameter (κ Kb ) is harder to set and we assume a quite widespread distribution, with mean of 10 and standard deviation of 5. We have estimated the model imposing a prior mean for κ Kb of 100 and obtained a posterior median of 40. Similarly when we set the prior mean at 2.5 the posterior median increased to 4. These results may suggest that the parameter is somehow identified in the the data and that the overlap between the prior and posterior distribution (see Figure 2) is not the result of lack of identification.
Posterior estimates
Tables 2A and 2B also report the posterior mean, median and 95 percent probability intervals for the structural parameters. Draws from the posterior distribution of the parameters are obtained using the random walk version of the Metropolis algorithm. We ran 10 parallel chains each of length 100,000. The scale factor was set in order to deliver acceptance rates between 20 and 30 percent. Convergence was assessed by means of the multivariate convergence statistics taken from Brooks and Gelman (1998) and also computing recursive means of the parameters of the model. Figures 2 and 3 report the prior and posterior marginal densities of the parameters of the model, excluding the standard deviation of the innovations of the shocks.
All shocks are quite persistent with the only exception of the price markup shock. The posterior mean of the parameter measuring the degree of consumption habits is estimated to be high, at 0.85. As far as monetary policy is concerned, our estimation confirms the weak identification of the response to inflation (see Figure 3 ) and the relatively large degree of policy rate inertia; moreover, the posterior median of the coefficient measuring the response to output growth is more than three times larger than the prior mean. Concerning nominal rigidities, we find that wage stickiness is more important than price stickiness. The degree of price indexation is relatively low (the median is 0.16) and confirms the finding of Benati (2008) who documents a low degree of indexation in the euro area in the single currency period. Concerning the parameters measuring the degree of stickiness in bank rates, we find that deposit rates adjust more rapidly than the rates on loans to changes in the policy rate. This results is not surprising given that our measure of deposits include also time deposits, whose interest rates are typically very reactive to changes in money market rates. We have estimated a version of the model with flexible bank rates and found that the log of the marginal density is substantially lower than the corresponding one for the benchmark model (by around 50), suggesting that stickiness is a key feature of bank rates in the euro area. Finally, the posterior distribution for κ Kb stays very close to the chosen prior. As already mentioned, we experimented with larger and smaller values for the mean of the prior distribution. These experiments suggest that this parameter is partially identified in the data, in that in these cases the posterior distribution moves away from the prior one.
Properties of the estimated model
In this Section we study the dynamics of the linearized model using impulse responses, focusing on a contractionary monetary policy shock and on an expansionary technology innovation. Our aim is to assess whether and how the transmission mechanism of monetary and technology shocks is affected by the presence of financial frictions and financial intermediation.
The benchmark model, described in Sec. 3, introduces financial intermediation in a framework that already features a number of transmission channels for monetary impulses, which are usually at work in models with heterogeneous agents and borrowing constraints. In that category of models, the traditional interest rate channel is modified by the fact that only a fraction of the population (patient agents) are willing to postpone consumption when the real rate rises, and is accompanied by three additional channels, as listed, for example, in Calza et al. (2009) : (i) a nominal-debt channel, whereby, as interest and principal payments are in nominal terms, changes in inflation affect the ex-post distribution of resources across borrowers and lenders; (ii) a collateral-constraint channel, by which an innovation in the policy rate changes the shadow value of borrowing and therefore impacts on consumption; (iii) an asset-price effect, by which induced changes in asset prices alter the value of the collateral that agents can pledge. Iacoviello (2005) , among others, has shown that these channels can amplify and propagate the transmission of monetary impulses, when compared to standard models with representative agents and frictionless financial markets. Due to the interest-rate setting behavior of banks, our model features an intermediation spread, whose movements alter the pass-through of changes in the policy rate to bank rates, that are the relevant rates for consumption and investment decisions. This mechanism modifies the effectiveness of the transmission channels above mentioned. In particular, credit market power and the ensuing markup between lending rates and the policy rate amplify changes in the policy rate for borrowers (i.e. impatient households and entrepreneurs), while the markdown between the policy and the deposit rate implies an attenuating effect for lenders (i.e. patient agents). Sticky interest rates, instead, unambiguously induce an attenuation effect (with respect to a flexible-rate setup), as banks translate changes in the policy rate to borrowing and lending rates only partially. Finally, the impact of bank capital depends on the correlation between bank leverage (i.e. the inverse of the capital-to-asset ratio) and the policy rate: if bank leverage increases when policy is tightened, then the transmission of shocks to the real economy is amplified; on the contrary, a fall in leverage during periods of policy tightening smooths fluctuations in the real economy. Given these facts, the overall impact of financial intermediation on the transmission mechanism depends on the relative importance and the mutual interactions of the heterogenous effects to the various agents.
Overall, we find that after a monetary policy shock financial intermediation attenuates the response of real variables, mainly reflecting the presence of sticky bank rates. Also after a technology innovation banking somewhat dampens the response of output, mainly due to the impact of monopolistic power on consumption; in this case, however, banking also enhances the endogenous propagation mechanism of the model.
Monetary policy shock
The transmission of a monetary policy shock is first studied by analyzing the impulse responses to an unanticipated 50 basis points exogenous shock to the policy rate (r t ). Figure 4 shows the impulse responses, with parameter values set at the estimated posterior median. The red line (BK in the figure) plots impulse responses of the benchmark model, described in Section 3. In order to decompose the contribution of each distinctive feature of banking that is at work in that model, in the charts we compare the BK model with a number of other models, where we progressively shut down those features:
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(i) a model with sticky bank rates (SR model) where we get rid of bank capital, i.e. a model with a simplified balance-sheet for banks that includes only deposits on the liability side;
17
(ii) a model where we also remove stickiness in bank rate setting, i.e. we allow for flexible 16 Thus, the contribution of the various features is obtained as the difference in the responses among the models. It would be possible to re-estimate each of the model and perform the same comparison. However, in this case, all the parameters would change in order to fit the data and, therefore, it would not be possible to attribute any change in the propagation mechanism of shocks to a specific feature of the model. 17 In order to do so, we force the parameter κ Kb to be equal to 0 and we rebate banking profits to patient households in a lump-sum fashion.
rates (FR in the figure);
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(iii) a model where we eliminate market power for banks, i.e. where we assume that financial intermediaries operate in perfect competition; this model can be interpreted as a standard financial frictions framework, like Iacoviello (2005; FF in the figure);
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(iv) a model where we also remove the assets-price and nominal-debt channels, in order to obtain a setup as similar as possible to the New Keynesian standard (a "Quasi-New Keynesian" model -QNK).
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In our benchmark model (BK), the presence of financial intermediation and capital constraints does not qualitatively alter the responses of the main macroeconomic variables, when compared to standard results in the New Keynesian literature (QNK) or in a model with financial frictions (FF). Therefore, our model continues to be able to replicate stylized business cycle facts while it has the advantage to introduce new elements which realistically enrich the set of inter-linkages between macroeconomic and financial variables. In the face of a policy tightening, output and inflation contract (inducing a partial endogenous unwinding of the policy rate). Real interest rates for households and entrepreneurs go up, reflecting the increase in bank interest rates, and assets prices decline, determining a reduction in the present discounted value of collateral and a fall in lending, to both households and firms. On impact, bank profits get pushed up by the increase in bank intermediation spread, that more than offsets the reduction in the amount of intermediated funds; after a few quarters, however, profits turn negative as bank margin increases unwind while loans and deposits remain negative for longer. Following profits, bank capital initially increases but it then turns negative after about ten quarters.
From a quantitative point of view, however, the benchmark model (BK) differs substantially from the FF model where a single interest rate exists. In particular, the contractionary effect of the policy tightening is attenuated in the BK model. This effect is due to the presence of sticky bank rates, that dampens the response of retail loan rates, thus reducing the contraction in loans, consumption and investment (see the difference between the SR and the FR lines). The impact of market power (i.e. the difference between the FR and FF lines) on output is rather limited, reflecting the differentiated effects on borrowers and lenders, which almost mutually offset in the aggregate. In particular, the loan-interest rate markup determines a bigger increase of the relevant rates for impatient households and entrepreneurs in the FR model, while the markdown for the deposit rate attenuates the restriction for patient households. As a consequence, borrowers' consumption and investment decline by more (in FR with respect to FF), while savers' consumption decreases by less. Finally, the introduction of a link between the capital position of banks and the spread on loans has, instead, virtually no effect on the dynamics of the real variables (as represented by the differences between the BK and the SR lines); this partly reflects the small value estimated for the parameter κ Kb , which -as mentioned before -we use to perform this exercise.
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Our findings about the presence of an overall attenuating effect of banking after a monetary policy shock are in line with the results obtained by Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) . In their model, the attenuation effect stems from the presence of procyclical marginal costs and occurs only when the monetary impulse is very persistent. The attenuation effect in our model is more general, as bank rate adjustment is sluggish irrespective of the persistence of monetary shocks. A similar attenuator effect arises also in Andrés and Arce (2008) and Aslam and Santoro (2008) . In these models, such effect is mainly the result of a steady-state spread in the banking sector due to imperfectly competitive financial intermediation: we share the same result, but we highlight it is the outcome of an amplification effect on borrowers and an attenuation effect on savers. Christiano et al. (2008) present a model with financial intermediaries. Their banks are rather different compared to ours, as they operate under perfect competition and therefore cannot set retail interest rates. Regarding the monetary transmission mechanism, they find that the presence of banks and financial frictions magnifies the response of output and induces higher persistence; however, they also find that banks play a marginal role in propagating the monetary impulse while the financial accelerator is more important.
Technology shock
The transmission of a technology shock is studied by looking at the impulse responses coming from the same set of models illustrated in the previous paragraph. Figure 5 shows the simulated responses of the main macroeconomic and financial variables following a shock to a E t equal in size to the estimated standard deviation of TFP. In line with the basic financial frictions setupà la Iacoviello (2005; FF), in our benchmark model the expansion which follows a positive technology shock is boosted by a financial acceleration mechanism and, at the same time, dampened by a debt deflation effect. In addition, the presence of imperfectly competitive financial intermediation amplifies both of these channels, while sticky rates and bank capital alter only marginally the picture. Overall, a dampening effect prevails on impact, so that consumption and output in the three models with banking (FR, SR, BK) feature a common attenuation in the first few quarters, more intense than the one prevailing in the FF case; but, as policy and loan rates decrease more in response, real variables display a higher persistence: output reaches a peak after about 10 quarters, as compared to 7 in the FF model.
With respect to the financial acceleration mechanism, the existence of markups on loan rates provides an amplifying contribution to the expansion following the technology shock.
The usual downward pressure on prices determined by the shock induces a policy rate cut: with imperfectly competitive banking, interest rates on loans fall even more, by a measure of the markup. Thus, investment is boosted both by the technological improvement and by a particularly eased access to credit. The accumulation of physical capital (and also of housing by impatient households) pushes assets prices up, so that borrowers also benefit from the wider access to credit that a higher collateral value allows.
With respect to the debt deflation mechanism, this expansionary effect is somewhat dampened by the fact that debt contracts are signed in nominal terms and with ratesetting banks. In fact, deflation increases the real value of debt obligations and limits resources available to borrowers, both directly and through second-round assets-price effects on the collateral value. In our models where the banking sector is imperfectly competitive, markups applied on loan rates make debt service higher: a given deflation leaves debtors with a higher burden of real debt obligations which weighs more on their resources and on their spending, so that the dampening of the supply shock due to the existence of nominal debt is initially stronger.
The market power enjoyed by banks also plays a role in the delayed propagation of the technological improvement. The initially stronger attenuation of demand exerts additional downward pressure on prices, triggering a more aggressive reduction of the policy rate in the first year, and the existence of markups induces an even stronger reduction of loan rates, which reach a minimum by the end of the first year. This improvement in credit conditions boosts real activity, allows entrepreneurs to further expand investment, which induces a higher price of capital and hence higher collateral valuations, reenforcing the initial effect. As labor becomes more productive, entrepreneurs increase labor demand too. Wages set by impatient households, initially moderated by the adverse wealth effect, increase with a delay too, and so does consumption for this group of agents. Overall, the dynamics of consumption and investment are delayed with respect to the FF setup, and this translates in a higher persistence in output.
The presence of sticky interest rates limits the reduction of bank rates, and hence the expansion of lending and aggregate demand, but overall it affects only marginally the impulse responses of the main real variables (see the difference between the SR and the FR lines). Finally, the presence of bank capital mainly affects the behavior of investment (see the difference between the BK and the SR lines), by establishing a link between the amount of credit available to firms and bank profits. In fact, investment peaks around 40% below the level achieved under the SR model, mainly because lending is now restrained by the fall in bank capital that follows from a contraction of bank profits. In turn, the decline in profits is related to the endogenous countercyclical response of the interest rate margin (the differential between loan and deposit rates), which is the main source of bank profits.
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22 Empirically, the differential between loan and deposit rates is countercyclical. See, e.g., Aliaga-Díaz and Olivero (2008) for evidence on the U.S.
Applications
Once the model has been estimated and its propagation mechanism studied, we can use it to address the two applied issues raised in the Introduction. First, what role did the shocks originating in the banking system play in the dynamics of the main variables since the burst of the financial crisis? Second, what are the effects of a credit crunch originating from a fall in bank capital?
The role of financial shocks in the business cycle
In order to quantify the relative importance of each shock in the model we perform an historical decomposition of the dynamics of the main macro and financial variables of the euro area. This decomposition was obtained by fixing the parameters of the model at the posterior median and then using the Kalman smoother to obtain the values of the innovations for each shock. The aim of the exercise is twofold: on the one hand, we want to investigate how our financially-rich model interprets the slowdown in 2008 and thus learn from the model which shocks were mainly responsible for the current slowdown. On the other hand, to the extent that the overall story told by the model is consistent with the common wisdom emerged so far about the origins and causes of the current crises, we can use this experiment as an indirect misspecification test for our model.
For this exercise we have divided the 13 shocks that appear in the model in three groups. First there is a "macroeconomic" group, which pulls together shocks to the production technology, to intertemporal preferences, to housing demand, to the investment-specific technology, and to price and wage markups. Then, the "monetary policy" group isolates the contribution coming from the non-systematic conduct of the monetary policy. Finally, the "financial" group consists of shocks originating in the credit sector: those are the shocks to the loan-to-value ratios on loans to firms and households, the shocks to the markup on the bank interest rates and the shock to the balance sheet. Figure 6 shows the results of the exercise for some key macro variables. Concerning output (defined as the sum of consumption and investment) the results of the historical decomposition suggest that macro and financial shocks were primary drivers behind the rise of 2006-2007 while the sharp slowdown of 2008 was essentially caused by the latter shocks.
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The financial shocks affect the real economy mainly through their effect on investment and the decomposition of that variable confirms how unusually large (positive) shocks, mainly related to firms' LTV ratios, were responsible for the positive performance of investment in 2006 and 2007 and how these same shocks turned negative in 2008, accounting for the fall in investment. Macroeconomic shocks also played a role in the slowdown of 2008, in that their positive contribution to the dynamics of output reduced basically to zero during 2008, after having been quite high the year before. Looking a bit closer into that category, it turns out that an important contributor in this group were price markup shocks. The reason why these shocks are estimated to be so important in the current juncture is that they are likely to be capturing the effects of the sharp increase in commodity prices that occurred in the first half of 2008. The large contribution of these shocks to inflation confirms this hypothesis. Turning to the policy rate, the macroeconomic shocks exerted a positive contribution in 2008, although the contribution of price markup shocks turned negative starting in the last quarter; on the other hand, monetary policy shocks are found to have exerted negative effects on the policy rate between the end of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008. In order to understand these results, one has to recall that over this period, which was characterized by great uncertainty on the consequences of the financial crisis, the ECB kept the interest rate on the main refinancing operations fixed at 4.0 per cent until July 2008 when it was raised by 25 basis points in order to counteract inflationary pressures stemming from the surge in commodity prices. Since mid-2008, the contribution of credit sector shocks became predominant and accounts for the bulk of the rapid reduction in the policy rate in the last quarter of 2008.
In Figure 7 we collect the results of the historical decomposition of loans to households and firms and the corresponding bank rates. In this case we find convenient to divide the "financial" group in three sub-categories: shocks directly related to loans to households (i.e., shocks to households' LTV and to the markup on interest rates on their loans), shocks directly related to loans to firms, and the rest of financial shocks (markup shock on deposit rate and bank balance sheet shock). The dynamics of the interest rates on loans to firms and households were mainly driven by macroeconomic shocks. However, shocks related to the firms side of credit played an important role in driving up the rate on loans to firms since 2005, while monetary policy shocks were relatively important drivers between 2006 and 2007, when the ECB raised the policy rate from the very low levels reached in June 2003. Loans to firms were driven almost exclusively by shocks related directly to the firms side of credit, with the notable exception of 2008 when a negative contribution came from macroeconomic shocks, among which a significant role was played, again, by price markup shocks until the third quarter and, from then on, by shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment. Concerning loans to households, a main driver of its dynamics turns out to be the housing demand shock (within the macro group), since it explains most of the strong rise in 2006 and, at a decreasing pace, in 2007, as well as of the subsequent decline in 2008, tracking the house prices cycle. Consistently with indications from the BLS for that period, our results explain with lower loan-to-value ratios the early deceleration of loans to households in the year before the outburst of the crisis.
To sum up, the exercise taught us that the credit sector shocks considered in our model have played an important role in shaping the dynamics of the euro area in the last business cycle and, more importantly, according to the model they did so in a way that nicely squares with our prior knowledge and expert judgement of macroeconomists about what has happened.
The effects of a bank capital loss
Starting in the summer of 2007, financial markets in advanced economies entered a protracted period of considerable strain. The initial deterioration in the US sub-prime mortgage market quickly spread across other financial markets, affecting the valuation of a number of assets. Banks, in particular, suffered losses from significant write-offs on complex instruments and reported increasing funding difficulties, in connection with the persisting tensions in the interbank market and with the substantial hampering of securitization activity. A number of them were forced to recapitalize and improve their balance sheets. In addition, intermediaries reported that concerns over their liquidity and capital position induced them to tighten credit standards for the approval of loans to the private sector. Since the October 2007 round, banks participating in the euro area Bank Lending Survey reported to have considerably tightened their credit standards and, at the same time, to have strongly increased the margins charged on average loans to households and firms ( Figure 1) . When asked about the motivations behind these developments, banks pointed predominantly to the role played by the costs incurred in managing their capital position (right panels in Figure 1 ). These survey results therefore vividly picture a situation in which a negative shock in the US financial markets generated conditions for real effects in the euro area via its impact on the capital positions of banks, and on the availability and cost of bank credit. Against this background, it is of the essence for policymakers, when evaluating the appropriateness of the monetary policy stance, to be able to reckon the impact of such bank balance sheets effects as to the availability and cost of credit.
As our model is particularly well suited to analyze such a question, in this section we use it to study what happens if bank capital suffers a strong negative shock. In order to run the simulation, we modify the model introducing the possibility of an unexpected and persistent contraction in bank capital K b . We do not attempt to construct a quantitatively realistic scenario; this would indeed be very difficult, given the conflicting indications coming from hard and survey evidence on realized and latent bank capital losses and on the tightening of credit standards, in particular in the euro area, and given the uncertainty on the effects that have already occurred and on those that might still be in the pipeline. Instead, we mainly want to study the transmission and amplification mechanisms that account for the macroeconomic effects of bank capital losses. We calibrate the shock so as to obtain, on impact, a fall of bank capital equal to 5 percent of its pre-shock level. The persistence of the shock is set to 0.95 in order to obtain a persistent fall of the capital/assets ratio below its steady state value (9 percent). Figure 8 shows the effects of this experiment using the median of the posterior distribution of the parameters and under an alternative calibration in which the only difference is that it is particularly difficult (and costly) to raise new capital, i.e. in which we increase by a factor of 10 the coefficient on the adjustment costs on the capital/assets ratio κ Kb (from an estimate slightly below 10).
In the benchmark case, the decline in bank liabilities following the shock leaves banks too leveraged, and with a burden of costs from deviating from capital requirements. It is then optimal for banks to try to re-balance assets and liabilities by reducing loans and increasing deposits: they do so by increasing all retail rates, which weakens loans demand and stimulates deposits demand. The reduction in loans is of major concern for banks since they need to approach rapidly the capital/loans target: therefore, loan rates undergo a higher increase than the deposit rate. Loan volumes decrease both for entrepreneurs and for impatient households, reducing resources available to them. Entrepreneurs decrease investment substantially and move to a larger capital utilization, given that its relative cost has decreased and that physical capital is less useful as a collateral; they increase labor demand. Labor is more productive, and becomes more costly: wages are set higher if demand by firms has to be met. The initial increase in labor income sustains consumption of households, in particular of impatient agents, and limits the fall in output, at least on impact: later on, in the beginning of the third year, the contraction in output is three times the one on impact, at almost 0.3 percent. Monetary policy is quite unaffected by the exogenous change in bank capital positions: the policy rate increases only slightly in response to some upward movements in prices which reflect solely the increase in labor and capacity costs. Increasing the cost of deviating from the target capital/assets ratio does not change dynamics substantially. Obviously, all responses to the bank capital loss shock are harshened. The most significant variation relates to the fact that, with a higher deviation cost, banks' optimal adjustment strategy assigns a greater importance to deleveraging, with respect to a plain squaring of the balance sheet: in fact, while in the benchmark case the capital loss was also countered via an increase in deposits, with a higher cost of deviating from the target K b /B ratio banks aim mainly at decreasing loans and increasing capital (through higher loan rates and intermediation margin) and therefore stop increasing rates on deposits (whose volumes actually fall). In this case, these dynamics are key to a much faster recovery of the banking capital position and of leverage, which becomes almost complete after just one and a half year.
Concluding remarks
The paper has presented a model in which entrepreneurs and impatient households contract loans subject to borrowing constraints. Loans are supplied by imperfectly competitive banks using both deposits collected from savers and bank capital that they accumulate out of reinvested earnings. Margins charged on loans depend on the interest rate elasticities of loan and deposit demands, on the degree of interest rate stickiness and on the bank capital-to-assets ratio. Banks balance-sheet constraints establish a link between the business cycle, which affects bank profits and thus capital, and the supply and the cost of loans.
The model has been estimated using Bayesian techniques and data for the euro area over the period 1998:1-2009:1 and used to analyze three important issues. First, we study how financial intermediation modifies the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and technology shocks. Overall, after a monetary shock, the presence of financial intermediation induces an attenuation effect on real variables, mainly reflecting the presence of sticky bank rates. In the case of a technology shock, imperfect competition in banking generates some attenuation as well, specially of consumption, but it also determines additional persistence in the response of real activity. The quantitative impact of the presence of a bank capital requirement on responses to a monetary policy shocks turns out to be negligible; however, the link between loan margins and the capital-to-assets ratio significantly dampens the response of investment after a technology innovation.
Secondly, we analyze the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy and their contribution to business cycle fluctuations. In particular, we show that shocks in the banking sector explain the largest fraction of the fall of output in the euro area in 2008, while macroeconomic shocks played a smaller role.
Finally we simulate a "credit crunch" scenario via an unexpected and exogenous destruction of banking capital and find that the effects of this shock can be sizeable, particularly on investment.
Together with results in papers like Christiano et al. (2008) , our findings suggest the need to include explicitly financial and credit shocks when building general equilibrium models to analyze business cycle fluctuations: neglecting them, not only on the demand but also on the supply side of credit, could lead to miss relevant drivers of the cycle. 
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A.4 Goods retailers
The retail goods market is assumed to be monopolistically competitive. Retailers are just "branders": they buy the intermediate good from entrepreneurs at the wholesale price P W t and differentiate it at no cost. Each retailer then sells his unique variety applying a markup over the wholesale price, taking into account his demand characterized by a stochastic price-elasticity ε y t . Retailers' prices are sticky and are indexed to a combination of past and steady-state inflation, with relative weights parameterized by ι p ; if retailers want to change their price beyond what indexation allows, they face a quadratic adjustment cost parameterized by κ p . They must choose {P t (j)} ∞ t=0 to maximize profits (accruing to patient households) given by
subject to a downward sloping demand coming from consumers maximization of a consumption aggregator
A.5 Monetary policy
A central bank is able to exactly set the interest rate prevailing in the interbank market r t . In setting the policy rate, the monetary authority follows a Taylor rule of the type
where φ π and φ y are the weights assigned to inflation and output stabilization, respectively, r is the steady-state nominal interest rate,
is aggregate output and ε r t is an i.i.d. shock to monetary policy with normal distribution and standard deviation σ r .
A.6 Aggregation and market clearing
In the final good market, the equilibrium condition is given by the following resource constraint
where In the housing market, equilibrium is given bȳ
whereh denotes the exogenous fixed housing supply stock.
Deposits: Outstanding amounts of overnight deposits (total maturity), deposits with agreed maturity up to 2 years and deposits redeemable at notice up to 3 months, households and non-profit institutions serving households, euro area (changing composition). Source: ECB.
For bank retail interest rates, we join two ECB data set. From 2003:1, we use harmonized monthly data from the MFI Interest Rate (MIR) statistics, in new business coverage as it reflects better than the outstanding amounts the extent to which the policy rate impulse is transmitted to retail bank rates. Data from MIR are extended back to 1998:1 resorting to the euro area Retail Interest Rate (RIR) data set, compiled by ECB until 2003:9. Since original national data in RIR are neither harmonized in coverage nor in nature (nominal or effective), we check stability of the relation between comparable MIR-RIR rates series over the 9-month overlapping period of 2003 before using monthly variations in comparable series from RIR to backcast MIR rates.
Volumes of loans and deposits are taken in outstanding amounts: in fact, if taken in new business coverage (available from 2003:1 in MIR) the high volatility of these series would, first, not allow a safe backcasting of volumes data and, second, induce undue instability when used as weights for aggregating the various existing interest rate series into our level of breakdown. Financial shocks include shocks to the loan-to-value ratios on loans to firms and households, shocks to the markup on the bank interest rates and the balance sheet shock. Households financial includes the shock to LTV for loans to households and the shock to the interest rate markup on their loans. Firms financial includes the shock to LTV for loans to firms and the shock to the interest rate markup on their loans. Finally, other financial includes the markup shock on deposit rate and the shock to the bank balance sheet. The capital/assets ratio is expressed in percentage points. All others graphs report percentage deviations from steady state.
